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Abstract 
 
Generally, the goals of digital forensic investigation process in a cyber crime are to identify the origin of the 
incident reported as well as maintaining the chain of custody so that the legal process can take its option. However, 
the traceability process has become a key or an important element of the digital investigation process, as it is 
capable to map the events of an incident from different sources in obtaining evidence of an incident to be used for 
other auxiliary investigation aspects. Hence, this paper introduces the adaptability of the traceability model to 
illustrate the relationship in the digital forensic investigation process by integrating the traceability features. The 
objective of this integration is to provide the capability of trace and map the evidence to the sources and shows the 
link between the evidence, the entities and the sources involved in the process. Additionally, the proposed model 
is expected to help the forensic investigator in obtaining accurate and complete evidence that can be further used 
in a court of law. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cyber crimes or digital crime are now serious, 
widespread, aggressive, growing, and increasingly 
sophisticated, which poses major implications for 
national and economic security [1].  Many industries 
and institutions, public- and private-sector 
organizations (particularly those within the critical 
infrastructure) are at significant risk.  This statement 
has been proved by the number of complaints received 
and processed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) in collaboration with Internet Crime Complain 
Center (IC3).  In 2006, 200,481 complaints were 
received and has been increased in 2010 [2] as 
illustrated in Fig.  1.  
 
 
Fig. ‎1 Yearly Comparisons of Complaints Received Via the IC3 Website 
 
This was a 34.01% increase as compared to 2010 when 
303,809 complaints were received. From all complaints 
received in 2006 and 2010, IC3 referred 86,729 
complaints and 121,710 complaints respectively to 
federal, states and local law enforcement agencies all 
around the country for further considerations.  
Although IC3 primarily refers complaints with claims 
of dollar losses, the top ten referred complaints indicate 
that 2.8% of complaints are computer intrusion and 
being increased to 9.1% in 2010. 
From the cyber crime or complaints reported, it 
indicates that the number of crimes involving 
computers and internet has grown over the last decades 
and it needs products that can assist law enforcement in 
using computer-based evidence to determine the who, 
what, where, when, and how for crimes.  As a result, 
computer and network forensics has evolved to assure 
proper presentation of computer crime evidentiary data 
into court and the role of forensic become highly 
important to get digital evidence. 
The purpose of a forensic investigation can be 
established by either identifying the offender of a case, 
or establishing an evidence to build a case against the 
offender [3]. As both situations are common in the law 
enforcement perspective, the ability to trace the source 
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to an evidence or vice versa is essential [4]. 
Additionally, another limitation is the acceptability of 
evidence that differs in each of these situations. There 
was also an issue of origin identification and cross 
referencing in investigation process [5] [6]. Hence, the 
traceability information is important to avoid the 
mislaid of decision and valuable information in 
collecting and analyzing during the investigation 
process.  
Due to this fact, the goal of this research is to adapt 
and integrate traceability in the digital forensic 
investigation process that represents the traceability 
information in the stage of conceptual and component 
composition. The purpose of this integration is to help 
the forensic investigator obtain accurate and complete 
evidence of the incident. In this paper, the proposed 
adaptation will be constructed based on the malware 
intrusion scenario. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The 
next section explains the related work on traceability, 
traceability models and digital forensic investigation 
process. Section III further describes the integration 
traceability in digital forensic investigation. The 
adaptation of traceability model is proposed in Section 
IV and a conclusion, together with future works is 
summarized in the last section.  
2. RELATED WORK 
2.1 Overview of Traceability 
Traceability is the means to identify and follow real 
or imaginary objects through a process chain [7]. It 
gives the opportunity to back-track a chain of events, or 
to predict process outcomes given in the origin of an 
object.  Traceability can be used in different areas. 
Even though traceability can also be defined in many 
ways, the meaning is to be able to trace and get 
information. ISO 8402:1995 defines traceability as the 
ability to trace the history, application or location of an 
entity, by means of recorded identifications. 
Traceability is a tool to achieve different objectives 
and can never be completed. Therefore, [8] described 
the definition of traceability can be broad, because in 
most of the time the processes are very complex. On 
the other hand, [9] defined traceability as the ability to 
map events in cyberspace, particularly on the Internet, 
back to real-world instigators, often with a view to 
holding them accountable for their actions. In contrast, 
[10] define traceability in the networks perspective as 
how difficult it is to establish the source and destination 
of communications on computers and communication 
networks, such as the Internet. Therefore, based on the 
definition reviewed in this research, this paper 
summarized the definition of traceability as the ability 
to trace and map the events of an incident from 
difference sources in order to obtain evidence of an 
incident for further process of investigation.  
In order to trace the requirement, the traceability 
approach is needed. Hence, [11] suggested that tracing 
the requirement can be performed in several ways 
based on the direction of tracing activities that are 
forward traceability and backward traceability as 
depicted in Fig.2. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Basic Traceability Approach 
 
Forward traceability approach defined in [12] is the 
ability to trace a requirement to components such as a 
design or implementation whereas backward 
traceability is the ability to trace requirement to its 
sources such as a person, institution, and argument. 
This basic concept of these traceability approaches can 
be represented as in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3 Concept of Backward and Forward Traceability  
 
Forward traceability approach is common in 
software requirements perspective. In this approach, all 
related test procedures used to ensure the test 
procedures comply with the changed requirement and 
the components built to meet the requirement can be 
obtained. Thus, it is used to investigate the impact of 
the requirement’s change [11] [13] in which it provides 
the ability to analyze the changes on the components. 
Meanwhile, backward traceability approach is used 
when the stakeholder is required to understand the 
changes happen such as when, what and how the 
requirement changed by investigating the information 
used to describe the changed requirement. In this 
approach, several useful information that point towards 
to the source will be obtained such as who the person 
interested in the requirement is, what documents from 
which requirement was extracted are, which 
departments the requirement is related, and when the 
changes to the requirement is done. 
However, [13] [14] [15] suggested that in order to 
have a well managed requirements, traceability can be 
established from the source requirements to its lower 
level requirements and from the lower level 
requirements back to their source. This reveals that it is 
Traceability Approach
Forward Traceability
Backward Traceability
Requirement
Which 
Components?
Which Source?
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necessary to trace a requirement to the artifacts that 
implement it as well as tracing from an artifact to the 
requirement that the artifact itself implements. This 
circumstances create an idea on tracing in both ways, 
forward and backward or called as bidirectional 
approach as discussed in [16]. Hence in order to 
provide an accurate and complete evidence to prosecute 
the offender, this research will use the traceability 
approach discussed in [16]. To demonstrate the 
approach, knowledge of organizing the procedures, 
techniques and tools are needed. Identified as a 
traceability model, this knowledge is discussed in the 
next sub-section. 
2.2 Traceability Model 
A traceability model is a central component of a 
traceability environment around where the tracing 
procedures, techniques or methods, and tools are 
organized. A traceability model not only defines what 
entities and traces are, and which traces should be 
captured, but also represents traceability information in 
the stage of conceptual design, component composition, 
deployment and runtime [17] [18] . However, based on 
[18] [17] [11], the traceability model is used to 
represent the traceability information which 
demonstrate the relationship between the traces, entities 
and sources involved in a process or system. 
In a traceability model, the conceptual explanation is 
covered by three features, namely the definition, the 
production and the extraction of traces [11]. The 
definition feature is concerned with the specification of 
the traces and traceable objects. It is within this feature 
that traceability model should define its traces, 
attributes and represented method. The definition of 
traces and traceable objects should promote a uniform 
understanding in order to avoid any errors caused by 
different interpretation during the tracing activities. 
The production feature is concerned with the capture 
of traces that is usually by the means of an explicit 
registration of the objects and their relationships. The 
trace production deals with the actual occurrence of 
traces that roughly corresponds to the pragmatics of a 
traceability model in order to get a constructive 
traceability model.  
The extraction feature of the traceability model is 
concerned with the actual process of tracing such as the 
retrieval of registered traces. A traceability model 
should provide diverse and flexible ways to retrieve 
(extract) the information registered in it as discussed in 
[19].  
Consequently, a traceability model should provide a 
representation for traces and trace attributes as 
discussed in [17] in which the trace model provide two 
significants guidelines; relationship guideline and 
tracing guideline. The former guideline describes the 
relationship guidelines that explain what traces should 
be established and the later guideline describes how 
traces determined by the relationship guidelines should 
be documented. Both guidelines establish the structures 
containing the elements and the relations used in 
tracing, specifying their type as well as the constraints 
under which elements of the model can be related.  
Hence, this research will employ all three features of 
the traceability model by adapting and integrating the 
features into the forensic investigation process. The 
goal of this adaptation and integration is to acquire 
accurate and complete evidence traces to help the 
forensic investigator on investigation process especially 
on collecting the evidence and the evidence sources of 
an incident. 
2.3 Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
In the digital forensics investigation practices, there 
are over hundreds of digital forensics investigation 
procedures developed all over the world. Each 
organization tends to develop its own procedures and 
some focused on the technology aspects such as data 
acquisition or data analysis [20]. Most of these 
procedures were developed for tackling different 
technology used in the inspected device. As a result, 
when underlying technology of the target device 
changes, new procedures have to be developed.  
A research done in [21] introduced a mapping 
process which occurs inside digital forensic 
investigation process model. The mapping is 
formulated by grouping and merging the same 
activities or processes in five phases that provide the 
same output into an appropriate phase. From the 
analysis, most of the models consist of the critical 
phases which are Phase 2 – Collection and Preservation, 
Phase 3 – Examination and Analysis, and Phase 4 – 
Presentation and Reporting except Phase 1 and Phase 5. 
Even though, Phase 1 and Phase 5 are not included in 
some of the model reviewed, the study done by [22] 
[23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] indicate that both 
phases are important to ensure the completeness of the 
investigation.  Phases 1 is to ensure the investigation 
process can start and run in the proper procedure, and 
protect the chain of evidence. While by eliminating 
Phase 5, it will lead to the possibility of the incomplete 
investigation and no improvement in investigation 
procedures or policies. Therefore, a good model should 
consist of all important phases; Preparation Phase, 
Collection and Preservation Phase, Examination and 
Analysis Phase, Presentation and Reporting, and 
Disseminating the case. 
[21] findings also show that the existing models 
mentioned in each of the proposed models build on the 
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experience of the previous; and some of the models 
have similar approaches and some of the models focus 
on different areas of the investigation. However, all of 
the models in the output mapping have the same output 
even though the activity is slightly difference on the 
term used and the order of the steps. On the other hand, 
all of these frameworks identified in the output 
mapping show that each framework has their own 
strength; however until nowadays there is no single 
framework that can be used as a general guideline for 
investigating all incident cases.  
Therefore, in order to obtain the evidence and for it 
to be accepted in the court of law, digital forensic 
investigation must be successfully performed without 
tampering the evidence. Additionally, the chain of 
evidence should be presented to prove the evidence is 
legitimate. Hence, the evidence traceability 
identification of the origin of the crime scene or the 
location of the incident or crime originated is one of the 
important elements during the digital forensic 
investigation process and become the first challenge in 
the investigation as mentioned in [6] [31] [32].  
3. TRACEABILITY IN DIGITAL FORENSIC 
INVESTIGATION PROCESS 
In digital forensic investigation process, tracing is 
described as a process of finding or discovering the 
origin or cause of certain scenario. The tracing 
activities are able to discover the traces left in digital 
devices. In the computer crime perspective, trace can 
be found in any digital devices. These traces consist of 
activities such as login and logout of the system, visit 
of pages, accesses documents, create items and 
affiliation groups found in records of data. These traces 
data are analysed by identifying their relationship 
among the attributes such as port, action, protocol, 
source IP address and destination IP address where this 
consistent relationship will produce trace pattern of the 
incident or crime. This trace pattern can be further used 
on assisting the investigator during the investigation 
process. 
3.1 Incident Trace Pattern 
Incident trace pattern is essential in assisting the 
investigators tracing out the evidence found at crime 
scenes [33]. In this research, we affirm the definition of 
trace as any digital evidence in an incident. Meanwhile, 
tracing is defined as the observation of the moving 
trace on the various tracks. In addition, pattern is 
defined as a regular way in which certain scenario 
happened [34]. Therefore, in order to get a trace pattern, 
the observed movement of these trace is studied to 
confirm its regular way, with the help of the acquired 
hypothesis. 
The incident trace pattern is confirmed using two 
steps. Firstly, the hypothesis which explains the initial 
scenario of the incident is taken. Secondly, the trace 
which was recorded in the source of evidence (host and 
network logs) is formulated. Using these two, the 
movement is observed which conclude that within the 
source of evidence, there are three courses of action 
that occurred. This course of action is referred as an 
event instead of process due to their focuses. A process 
merely focuses on progress or series of action toward a 
particular result; whereas, an event focus on the 
occurrence of something which not only concern with 
its action, but also with the attributes associated with it 
[35]. 
The extraction of the two steps above derives the 
three events of incident which are scan, exploit and 
impact/effect. Scan consists of the inspection activity 
which are not only to find vulnerability, but also to 
determine any available services (e.g. port number) on 
the target system (system being attacked) [36]. In this 
activity, if the port number responds to a scan, it will 
indicate the type of service running on the target 
system and reveal the exploitable services to attackers. 
Therefore, once the system determined which services 
are running on it, the vulnerability of the system could 
be exploited. Eventually, these exploited vulnerability 
can become a threat, such as unauthorized access (gain 
access) or unavailable service for intended users (deny 
service). 
Exploit consists of the abuse activity traces that 
disclose any manipulation activity on the target system 
services such as attempting on downloading malicious 
codes to the target system and breaking the target 
system for opening backdoor on specific port.  
Meanwhile, the impact/effect event shows the traces on 
the goal of an attack which shows the goal of an attack 
as the consequences of the scan and exploits activities 
of the incident such as the target system is restarted, the 
services are terminated (expectedly) and new process is 
forced to be created. 
 
Event-based Forensic Trace Map 
Perspective’s Trace Pattern 
Victim Trace 
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Attacker Trace 
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Victim/Attacker 
Trace Pattern 
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Alternative features 
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Fig. 4 Event-based Forensic Trace Map 
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In this research, the combination of the three events 
discussed previously form different trace patterns in 
order to identify the offender of the incident: victim, 
attacker and victim/attacker. As this pattern reflects the 
complainer or perspective, henceforth, it is named as 
Perspective Trace Pattern. From the analysis and 
findings in [33], victim/attacker and victim perspective 
trace pattern must consists of all three events, and 
attacker perspective trace pattern must consist of scan 
and exploit events of incident but it is optional in 
having the impact/effect event as depicted in Fig. 4. 
However, the difference between them is the content of 
the attributes belongs to each of the events such as the 
number of the destination port open, the type of 
operation, the protocol of the connection request, the 
services that are vulnerable and the item transferred 
during the communication exist. 
The attributes of scan are communication exist, 
destination port open, operation type and connection 
request.  Conversely, the attributes of exploit event are 
similar to scan event, with an addition of vulnerable 
service attribute. Nevertheless, the attributes of 
impact/effect are communication exists, new process 
creates, malicious code transferred as well as service 
terminated.  
For the purpose of this paper, in explaining 
perspective trace pattern, let’s consider an incident that 
was caused by a worm, Sasser. Based on the logs (host 
and networks), the traces of scan event shows the 
attribute of communication exist between the victim 
and attacker via Destination IP Address and Source IP 
Address respectively. Next, the destination port open 
responded is port 445 and the operation type (action) is 
OPEN (in/out communication is allowed), whereas the 
connection request (protocol) is TCP (traffic packet is 
transmitted). The success of this event leads to the next 
event, exploit. In this event, the action continues with 
destination port open responded is 9996 and 5554. If 
the port 9996 is exploited, the operation type (action) is 
OPEN and the connection request is TCP, then partial 
exploit is in place. Port 5554 is also exploitable. If port 
5554 is exploited, the operation type (action) is OPEN-
INBOUND (traffic is allowed in) and the connection 
request is TCP (file is transmitted) which leads to 
vulnerable service (service) as FTP (file transfer 
occurred). We consider the exploit is successful if both 
ports above are exploited. As the consequences of the 
scan and exploit event, the impact/effect incident 
occurred. This event consists of few attributes namely; 
a) offender identified (who is victim and attacker), b) a 
process created (traffic action) which reside 
at %WINDIR%\System32\ftp.exe, c) the service 
terminated is lsass, and d) malicious code transferred 
(file transmitted) is ~\*.exe. The above example 
describes that the traces belong to attacker trace pattern. 
The example can also be represented as an algorithm 
depicted in Table 1. 
Table 1 Attacker Trace Pattern Algorithm 
Attacker Trace Pattern 
Event Name: Scan 
Attribute:-  
    Communication Exist   := Source IP Address, 
                             Destination IP Address 
    Destination Port Open := 445 
    Operation Type        := OPEN 
    Connection Request    := TCP 
Action  :- find_vulnerability( ); 
           determine_services( ); 
Event Name: Exploit 
Attribute:-  
     Communication Exist   := Source IP Address, 
                              Destination IP Address 
     Destination Port Open := 9996 || 5554 
     Operation Type        := OPEN || OPEN-INBOUND 
     Connection Request    := TCP || TCP 
     Vulnerable Services   := FTP (9996 && 5554) 
Action  :- scan( ); 
           show_manipulation_activity( ); 
Event Name: Impact/effect 
Attribute:-  
    Offender Identified         := Attacker 
    New Process Created         := %WINDIR%\System32\ftp.exe 
    Malicious Codes Transferred := ~\*.exe 
    Service Terminated          := lsass 
Action  :- exploit( ); 
           show_impact( ); 
 
3.2 Integration of Traceability Features and 
Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
In order to provide the capability of tracing and 
mapping the accurate and complete evidence in digital 
forensic investigation process, the relationship between 
each trace should be identified to form the incident 
trace pattern. In this research, the ways for identifying 
this relationship is accomplished using features in 
traceability approach (definition, production and 
extraction) discussed previously. The integration of the 
traceability model’s features (TMF) in digital forensic 
investigation process (DFIP) is illustrated in Table 2. 
In Table 2, TMF in DFIP indicate that there is a 
potential in implementing traceability features in 
forensic investigation process. As mentioned by [6] 
[37], traceability is an important element in forensic 
investigation process and it is related to the link 
element which is the key element used to form 
evidence’s chain of custody.  It is impossible to prevent 
all internet misuse but it is not impossible to identify 
and trace the evidence, and then take appropriate action.  
Table 2 The Integration of TMF and DFIP 
Feature  TMF TMF in DFIP 
Definition: 
related to the specification of the 
traces and traceable objects 
identify traces, 
attributes 
identify component in incident 
Production: 
related to the capture of traces 
(relationships) 
perception, 
registration and 
maintenance 
hypothesis, identify forward and 
backward traceability, 
preservation of evidence 
Extraction: 
related to the actual process of 
tracing 
trace extraction 
mechanism 
tracing the evidence using 
selective tracing to promote 
trace pattern 
 
Therefore, without the traceability information, the 
investigation decisions and other valuable information 
for collecting and analysing the evidence could be 
mislaid. Hence, a traceability approach is necessary and 
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in this research, the proposed integration is named as 
trace map model. 
3.3 Proposed Adaptation of Traceability Model in 
Digital Forensic Investigation Process Model 
The proposed adaptation of traceability model in 
digital forensic investigation process model is based on 
work done in [33] and later known as Trace Map 
Model. This model uses event-based traceability 
technique which was motivated from the traceability 
model discussed in [38]. Ramesh introduced three 
components: stakeholder, subject and object.  
 
 
trace to 
documents 
has role in 
manages 
STAKEHOLDER 
OBJECT SOURCE 
 
Fig. 5 Traceability Model [38] 
 
In this model, the stakeholder represents people who 
have an interest on requirements and on the tracing of 
requirements, the source represents the origins of a 
requirement and the artifacts used for documentation 
purposes, and the object represents the inputs and 
outputs being traced. In Fig. 5, the model represents 
what type of information is presented including salient 
attributes or characteristics of the information which is 
referred as object. For example, this information can be 
represented as an attribute of object and the traceability 
across various object is represented by a link namely 
traces to. The model also shows the stakeholders are 
the people who play different roles in the creation, 
maintenance and use the various objects and 
traceability links across them. These stakeholders act in 
different roles or capacities in the establishment and 
use the various conceptual object and traceability links. 
The subject represents the location of the documented 
traceability information i.e. which state that all objects 
are documented by subjects.  
Various dimension of traceability information is 
discussed in Ramesh’s model such as what kind of 
information is represented, who are the people that play 
the role, where and how the traceability information are 
represented, why and where the object are created, 
modified and evolved. The compatibility and the 
capability model also have been discussed in various 
business areas with different traceability focus. In this 
research, this model is adapted and integrated within 
the digital forensic investigation process which consists 
of three components, namely stakeholder, source of 
evidence and digital evidence as shown in Fig. 6.  
 
[events, attributes ] 
[admin, forensic investigator, 
complainer (perspective) ] 
[ devices, logs)] 
trace to 
documents 
has role in 
manages 
STAKEHOLDERS 
DIGITAL EVIDENCE SOURCE OF EVIDENCE 
 
Fig 6 Conceptual Diagram of Digital Forensic Investigation 
Process 
 
These components map to the components in 
Ramesh’s model: stakeholder, subject and object 
respectively. Stakeholders refer to the people involve in 
the whole process of digital forensic investigation such 
as the auditor, network administrator, complainer 
(perspective as discussed in [33]) and forensic expert. 
In this research, these investigators will manage the 
source of evidence on the incident reported such as the 
devices (host and network) and the logs involved in the 
incident. Meanwhile, the digital evidence is defined as 
events of incident (see subsection Trace Pattern) that 
are documented in the source of evidence. This current 
relationship is further depicted using the diagram in Fig. 
7. For the purpose of this research, the domain selected 
is malware intrusion incident. 
 
trace 
trace 
trace 
formulate 
derive 
derive 
Stakeholders 
complain 
Complainer 
Forensic 
Investigator 
Host 
Network 
Log 
Log 
Sources of Evidence 
Hypothesis 
Scan 
Exploit 
Impact 
Event of Incident 
Perspective’s 
Trace Pattern 
Digital Evidence 
map 
search Incident Report 
(V, A, MA)  
 
Fig.7 Trace Map Model 
 
Fig. 7 depicts the process of investigation is 
initializes when a complainer complains or reports the 
incident to the investigator (administrator and/or 
forensic investigator). Then, the process is continued 
by searching the relevance potential evidence based on 
the preliminary information reported by the complainer. 
The evidence is collected from the source of evidence: 
host and network that derive heterogenous log. 
Subsequently, a hypothesis (an assumption made to test 
the logical or empirical consequences) is formulated in 
order to trace the event of the incident. The traces of 
event gathered then are map to construct the 
perspective’s trace pattern.  
Based on the proposed Trace Map Model, the 
investigator could trace and map the traces of the 
incident that are used as the digital evidence of the 
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incident. In this model, the traces of the offender are 
based on the primary events of incident that scan, 
exploit and impact/effect. In each event of incident, the 
trace patterns of the perspectives (victim, attacker, 
multi-step attacker) are established. The model also 
assists the investigator on identifying the relationship 
between the source of evidence, the digital evidence 
and the people involve during the investigation process, 
and provide a complete and accurate digital evidence of 
the incident reported. 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Traceability is an important element in forensic 
investigation process and related to the link element 
which is the key element used in forming the chain of 
evidence. Therefore, this research introduced a Trace 
Map Model that derived from the adaptation and 
integration of the traceability in digital forensic 
investigation process. The proposed model is used to 
provide the forensic investigation the capability to trace 
and map the digital evidence and source of evidence 
during the forensic investigation process.  
This capability of the model is based on the 
preliminary assessment through the case study as 
presented in this paper. It also shows that the trace 
pattern enables us to identify the origin of malware 
intrusion through the traces attributes. These assist the 
investigator to show the relationship of the incident 
traces for obtaining the evidence accuracy and 
completeness that could enable the legal process to take 
its due course. In future, the effectiveness of the 
evidence tracing and mapping is evaluated through a 
validation process. It is foreseeable to develop a 
prototype that can be used as one of the forensic 
investigation tool through this proposed model. 
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